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CLEAR AND SIMPLE DEPORTATION RULES FOR CRIMES:
WHY WE NEED THEM AND WHY IT'S HARD TO GET THEM
REBECCA SHARPLESSt
ABSTRACT
In Padilla v. Kentucky, the U.S. Supreme Court held that defense at-
torneys have a Sixth Amendment duty to advise noncitizen clients of the
"clear" immigration consequences of a proposed plea agreement. This
Article argues that the Court's reference to clarity denotes predictability,
not simplicity, and that defense attorneys must advise their clients of
predictable immigration consequences, even if they are difficult to ascer-
tain. The scope of this duty has broadened as the U.S. Supreme Court has
made the crime-related deportation rules more determinate, although
many rules remain complex. A legislative move to a regime of simple
deportation rules would greatly facilitate the implementation of Padilla,
enhance the legitimacy of immigration law, and conserve judicial and
administrative resources. However, pro-immigrant reformers hesitate to
push for simple deportation rules because legislative reform in the area
of immigration and crimes would likely widen the deportation net.
Assuming the existence of the political will for more moderate treatment
of noncitizens with criminal convictions, this Article argues for a bright-
line trigger for the commencement of removal proceedings of five years
imprisonment actually served and calls for the restoration of judicial dis-
cretion to halt deportations on a case-by-case basis.
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INTRODUCTION
In the years since the U.S. Supreme Court decided Padilla v. Ken-
tucky,' courts and commentators have struggled to define the contours of
defense attorneys' duty to advise their noncitizen clients of the "clear"
2immigration consequences of plea agreements. Some take the position
that "defense attorneys must advise noncitizen clients as specifically as
research allows." 3 Others argue that it is too burdensome for defense
attorneys to determine whether some crimes fall within certain catego-
ries, like the case law-defined category of "crimes involving moral turpi-
tude."4 This Article builds on the scholarly work and jurisprudence con-
tending that the Padilla duty requires defense attorneys to research the
immigration statute and relevant case law, counsel their clients about
predictable immigration consequences, and attempt to negotiate an im-
migration-safe plea. As others have noted, a plethora of immigration law
resources for defense attorneys has existed for decades and continues to
grow and improve.5 The debate should not be whether defense counsel
I. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
2. Id. at 369; see, e.g., Lindsay C. Nash, Considering the Scope of Advisal Duties under
Padilla, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 549, 551-54, 561-71 (2011); C6sar Cuauht6moc Garcia Hernhndez,
Criminal Defense after Padilla v. Kentucky, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 475, 506 (2012)
3. Nash, supra note 2, at 554.
4. Garcia HernAndez, supra note 2, at 506.
5. For a list of the considerable resources available to defense counsel about the immigration
consequences of crimes, see Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioner-Appellant at 9-16, United States v. Rodriguez-Vega, 797
F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 2015). See also Maureen Sweeney, Categorical Analysis of Immigration Conse-
quences, YOUTUBE (July 28, 2014), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-eDA-
wVIedTO, and Maureen Sweeney, Divisibility of Criminal Statutes and the Modified Categorical
Analysis of Immigration Consequences, YOUTUBE (May 5, 2015), available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eAr6FcOzhK8 for helpful introductory explanations of the
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should reasonably be expected to advise about immigration consequenc-
es in light of the fact that immigration law can be difficult to master.
Rather, the scope of the Padilla duty is a function of immigration law's
predictability-a distinct concept from complexity. While some sets of
technical or difficult rules do not generate predictable results, others do. I
argue not only that the relevant concern is determinacy but also that the
legal rules relating to immigration consequences of crimes are increas-
ingly determinate.
Although the technical nature of immigration law should play no
role in defining the scope of the Padilla duty, Congress should strive to
make immigration law more accessible as it relates to criminal convic-
tions. While it is eminently reasonable to require that all defense attor-
neys learn the tools needed to render competent advice about immigra-
tion consequences, there are good reasons to simplify the rules, if we can
do so in a way that is both predictable and fair. The sheer number of re-
moval grounds, as well as the learning curve needed to understand and
apply the rules for measuring a criminal conviction against the grounds
of removal, has contributed to unevenness in the quality of immigration
advice by defense counsel across offices and jurisdictions. A simple and
determinate deportation rule would not only promote accurate advice by
defense counsel but would enhance the transparency and legitimacy of
our immigration system, help to ensure proper notice of immigration
consequences, and conserve judicial and administrative resources. What-
ever the scope of the Padilla duty, simpler rules would facilitate the dis-
charge of it.
Simple rules may never establish a foothold in this area of immigra-
tion law, however. Immigration advocates and pro-immigrant reformers
hesitate to push for such rules for fear that Congress would create an
even more punitive regime for immigrants convicted of a crime. History
teaches that when Congress legislates in the area of immigration and
6
crime, the result is expanded grounds of removal. The fear is that a
move to simple rules might result in a net loss for immigrants with a
criminal record seeking to defend against deportation. A further concern
is. that the most workable simple rule-one that tethers deportation to a
certain length of jail or prison sentence-would grant additional authori-
ty to sentencing judges to decide who will be subject to removal. Sen-
tencing practices vary notoriously by jurisdiction. Even worse, discrimi-
nation based on race and other factors distorts sentencing practices, rais-
categorical approach to analyzing the deportation consequences of crimes-discussed below as a
source of much confusion.
6. See infra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Caitlyn Lee Hall, Note, Good Intentions: A National Survey of Life Sentences for
Nonviolent Offenses, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 1101, 1106 (2013); Ronald Helms & David
Jacobs, The Political Context of Sentencing: An Analysis of Community and Individual Determi-
nants, 81 Soc. FORCEs 577, 577-78 (2002).
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ing concerns about bundling deportation so closely with sentencing.
Any reform proposal involving a sentence trigger must ameliorate these
significant drawbacks.
I argue that, on balance, both immigrants and our justice system
would be significantly better served if Congress were to repeal the cur-
rent crime-based grounds of removal and create a new ground based on a
trigger of over five years actual incarceration for a crime, and grant im-
migration judges broad discretion to override deportability based on sen-
tence length in appropriate cases.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I explains how Padilla's
holding that defense counsel has a "clear" duty "when the deportation
consequence is truly clear, . . . to give correct advice" refers to a duty to
convey an accurate prediction, when possible, even if it requires an anal-
ysis of complex rules.9 Part II maps "crimmigration" law and demon-
strates how even the complex rules in this specialized area of the law are
now generating more predictable results. Part III discusses the benefits
that would flow from a simple rule for determining which crimes trigger
immigration consequences. Part IV describes the barriers to the adoption
of such a rule, and Part V presents a proposal for reform.
I. SCOPE OF THE PADILLA DUTY
In Padilla v. Kentucky, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether
Jose Padilla's defense attorney had rendered ineffective assistance of
8. Shawn D. Bushway & Anne Morrison Piehl, Judging Judicial Discretion: Legal Factors
and Racial Discrimination in Sentencing, 35 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 733, 737 (2001) (finding that
disparate sentencing between African Americans and whites is approximately twenty percent);
Ojmarrh Mitchell & Doris L. MacKenzie, The Relationship Between Race, Ethnicity, and Sentenc-
ing Outcomes: A Meta-Analysis of Sentencing Research 8, 12 (Dec. 2004) (unpublished report),
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/208129.pdf (concluding, in an analysis of
eighty-five studies of sentencing practices "that even after taking legal factors into account, Latinos
and African-Americans were sentenced more harshly than whites on average"); see also TUSHAR
KANSAL, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, RACIAL DISPARITY IN SENTENCING: A REVIEW OF THE
LITERATURE I (Marc Mauer ed., 2005), available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rdsentencing review.pdf; CASSIA SPOHN, How
Do JUDGES DECIDE? THE SEARCH FOR FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE IN PUNISHMENT ix-xi (2002); Mar-
gareth Etienne, Sentencing Women: Reassessing the Claims of Disparity, 14 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 73, 73 (2010); Brian D. Johnson, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Sentencing Departures
Across Modes of Conviction, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 467-69 (2003); David B. Mustard, Racial,
Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. &
ECON. 285, 285 (2001); Samuel L. Myers, Jr., Racial Disparities in Sentencing: Can Sentencing
Reforms Reduce Discrimination in Punishment?, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 781, 781 (1993); Darrell
Steffensmeier & Stephen Demuth, Ethnicity and Judges' Sentencing Decisions: Hispanic-Black-
White Comparisons, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 145, 164-66 (2001); Jeffery T. Ulmer & John H. Kramer,
Court Communities Under Sentencing Guidelines: Dilemmas of Formal Rationality and Sentencing
Disparity, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 383, 397-402 (1996); Sonja B. Starr, Estimating Gender Disparities in
Federal Criminal Cases I (Univ. of Mich. Law & Econs. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-018,
2012), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=2144002; Jill K. Doemer, Explaining the Gender Gap in
Sentencing Outcomes: An Investigation of Differential Treatment in U.S. Federal Courts (May
2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Bowling Green State University), available at
https://etd.ohiolink.edul!etd.send file?accession=bgsul237482038&disposition=inline.
9. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 369 (2010).
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counsel under the Sixth Amendment.o The attorney failed to counsel Mr.
Padilla that his plea to a drug trafficking charge would result in his virtu-
ally automatic deportation." Padilla's crime straightforwardly fit within
the statutory grounds of deportation.12 Noting that "[t]he consequences of
Padilla's plea could easily be determined from reading the removal stat-
ute," the Court concluded that "[t]his is not a hard case in which to find
deficiency."' 3
The Court articulated its general holding as "when the deportation
consequence is truly clear . . . the duty to give correct advice is equally
clear."' 4 The Court's focus on clarity as the touchstone for when and how
attorneys should counsel clients about immigration consequences is best
understood as referring to predictability or determinacy-the degree to
which an immigration consequence like deportation is likely to occur. If
a plea can be predicted to lead to immigration consequences, the attorney
is obligated to counsel the client of these consequences.
In Mr. Padilla's case, the Court could ascertain with ease the result
of the drug plea because a quick glance at the statute reveals that virtual-
ly all drug crimes are grounds for removal.' 5 The Court's reference to the
lack of effort needed to determine the deportation consequence in Pa-
dilla's case should not be read to limit an attorney's duty to only simple
immigration assessments, however. At no point did the Court state that
attorneys are excused from advising their clients about predictable immi-
gration consequences simply because the assessment involves under-
standing and applying technical or multiple immigration rules. Nor did
the Court indicate that defense attorneys must only research the immigra-
tion statute, as opposed to relevant agency and court decisions.
At the same time, the Court's discussion of the scope of defense
counsel's duty is not a model of lucidity. In the paragraph announcing its
holding, the Court muddles discussion of counsel's duty to communicate
predictable results with commentary on the complexities of immigration
law.16 In one breath, the Court acknowledges that "[i]mmigration law can
be complex" and that some defense attorneys "may not be well versed
in" immigration law.' 7 In the next, the Court states, "There will, there-
fore, undoubtedly be numerous situations in which the deportation con-
sequences of a particular plea are unclear or uncertain." 18 The juxtaposi-
tion of these two sentences might suggest that ignorance of immigration
10. Id. at 359-60.
11. Id. at 368.
12. Id. at 368-69.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 369.
15. Id. at 368 ("In the instant case, the terms of the relevant immigration statute are succinct,
clear, and explicit in defining the removal consequence for Padilla's conviction.").
16. Id. at 369.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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law can excuse a failure to advise. The Court's use of the phrase "suc-
cinct and straightforward" could also be read as requiring that the law be
both predictable and simple.1 9 But such a reading would be a mistake.
The closing sentences of the Court's discussion make clear that the Court
requires defense attorneys to advise noncitizen defendants of immigra-
tion consequences that can be accurately predicted, even if they are not
immediately ascertainable. 20 The Court drives home its concern with
predictability by contrasting a case in which "the deportation conse-
quence is truly clear" with a scenario in which an attorney need only
advise that the plea "may carry a risk of adverse immigration conse-
,,2 I
quences.
To read the majority opinion to express a concern with complexity,
as opposed to clarity, would not only ignore the plain meaning of a
"clear" consequence but would make an unwillingness to research the
law an excuse for deficient lawyering. Such an approach to the Sixth
22Amendment would be unprecedented. The Court has never suggested
that the need for legal research puts certain advice outside the scope of a
lawyer's duty to provide competent counsel. To the contrary, the Court
has consistently upheld a lawyer's duty to investigate both the facts and
the law.23 In Strickland v. Washington,24 the Court stated that counsel is
expected to either conduct a "thorough investigation" of both the "law
and facts" or make a "reasonable professional judgment[]" that "makes
19. Id.
20. Id. at 374.
21. Id. at 369.
22. See Cdsar Cuauhtemoc Garcia Hern~ndez, Strickland-Lite: Padilla's Two-Tiered Duty for
Noncitizens, 72 MD. L. REv. 844, 850 (2013) (arguing that Padilla has broken from Strickland to
create an unprecedented Strickland-lite standard by "allow[ing] attorneys to provide legal advice to
noncitizen defendants without first unraveling the complexities of crime-based removal").
23. See, e.g., Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1089 (2014) ("[I]gnorance of a point of law
that [was] fundamental to his case combined with his failure to perform basic research on that point
is a quintessential example of unreasonable performance under Strickland"); Wiggins v. Smith, 539
U.S. 510, 511 (2003) (finding that "investigation supporting [counsel's] decision not to introduce
mitigating evidence" was not reasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 363-64, 373 (2000)
(finding deficient attorney performance where attorney incorrectly believed state law blocked access
to mitigation records in death penalty case); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 368-70, 385-
87 (1986) (finding deficient performance where attorney failed to engage in pretrial discovery based
on an incorrect understanding that the State was affirmatively required to turn over all inculpatory
evidence to the defense); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 62 (1985) (finding the first prong of
Strickland's test is "a restatement of the standard of attorney competence" which "[t]he failure of an
attorney to inform his client of the relevant law clearly satisfies"); see also Jenny Roberts, Too Little,
Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to Investigate, and Pretrial Discovery in Crim-
inal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1106 (2004) (discussing defense counsel's Sixth Amend-
ment duty to investigate the case). The duty to investigate the law applies to cases involving plea
agreements. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012) (acknowledging deficient perfor-
mance where attorney advised defendant to reject a favorable plea based on a misunderstanding of
the law).
24. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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particular investigations unnecessary." 25 The fact that a lawyer is practic-
ing outside his or her usual area, or is a new lawyer, is no excuse. 26
The distinct lenses of clarity and simplicity bring Justice Alito's
concurrence in Padilla into sharp focus. Justice Alito agreed that Mr.
Padilla's attorney had rendered ineffective advice but disagreed that de-
27fense counsel must advise about clear immigration consequences. De-
fense attorneys, in Justice Alito's view, discharge their Sixth Amend-
ment duty when they refrain from giving incorrect advice, tell their
noncitizen clients that they may be deported, and advise them to speak
with an immigration lawyer.28
Unlike the majority opinion, Justice Alito's concurrence rests on the
premise that the complexity of an area of the law limits an attorney's
duty, at least when it is outside of the attorney's normal area of exper-
tise.29 In Justice Alito's view, "Because many criminal defense attorneys
have little understanding of immigration law, it should follow that a
criminal defense attorney who refrains from providing immigration ad-
vice does not violate prevailing professional norms." 30 In other words, a
lack of skill or effort excuses a lawyer's failure to advise of predictable
consequences. Justice Alito discusses at length the complexity of the
immigration consequences of crimes, characterizing it as "quite com-
plex," "not 'easily ascertain[able],' and "dizzying." 3' He, however, nev-
er considers whether complex rules can be clear because they generate
predictable results. Instead, he appears to assume the opposite.32
It is incorrect to equate clarity with simplicity. Clarity and simplici-
ty, while sometimes related, are distinct attributes of legal rules.3 3 The
clarity of a rule or set of rules is the degree to which its application gen-
erates foreseeable or determinate results. In contrast, the relative simplic-
ity or difficulty of a rule or set of rules is how easily it can be under-
stood. The difficulty of a rule or area of the law could have several caus-
es, including the need to take multiple variables into account; a large
quantity of relevant statutes, regulations, and case law, or actors with
25. Id. at 690-91.
26. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 665 (1984) (acknowledging possible deficient
performance even though the "lawyer was young, . . . his principal practice was in real estate, [and
it] was his first jury trial"). The American Bar Association rules permit lawyers to take on represen-
tation in a new area of the law. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. (2011).
27. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 375 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring).
28. Id
29. Id at 376-77.
30. Id. at 377 (citation omitted).
31. Id. at 377-81.
32. See id. at 377-88. If Justice Alito were correct that the scope of the Sixth Amendment
depends on the simplicity of a legal regime, the enactment of simple rules would presumably make
the Sixth Amendment apply.
33. Scott Page explains the difference between simplicity and determinacy as follows: "Diffi-
culty corresponds to problems with lots of local optima. Uncertainty corresponds to situations in
which the value of an outcome depends on a state." Scott E. Page, Uncertainty, Difficulty, and Com-
plexity, 20 J. THEORETICAL POL. 115, 127 (2008).
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decision-making authority; the use of confusing or technical language,
including exceptions to general rules and exceptions to those exceptions;
and the degree to which relevant statutory provisions cross-reference
other provisions. 34 As discussed below, the rules governing immigration
consequences for a crime possess many of these features.
An example of a rule that is both simple and determinate is the rule
that drivers must stop in front of a stop sign and wait for a clear path
before proceeding. 35 Another example is the rule that young adults be-
come authorized to buy alcohol at age twenty-one. Predictability and
simplicity, however, need not run together. Some simple rules do not
generate predictable results. The "reasonable person" standard, for ex-
ample, is readily accessible to experts and nonexperts alike, but as Peter
Schuck has noted, the standard is "an example of an indeterminate rule"
because of the judgment needed to determine what counts as reasona-
ble.37 A long line of scholarly work has expounded upon the difference
between rules and standards, the latter being less determinate than the
former. More to the point for our purposes, rules that are relatively dif-
ficult to understand and apply can also generate predictable results. In-
deed, technical rules are often adopted with the goal of making an area of
the law more determinate. The complexity of the U.S. tax code, for ex-
ample, is driven by a desire to address all likely scenarios, close tax lia-
bility loopholes, and ensure fairness. 39
34. See Lance W. Rook, Laying Down the Law: Canons for Drafting Complex Legislation, 72
OR. L. REV. 663, 669-70 (1993).
35. Of course, the stop sign rule is somewhat more complicated, as there are rules about
which vehicle yields when more than one vehicle comes to a halt at the same time. Notwithstanding
this complexity, most would agree that the rules governing stop signs are relatively simple.
36. Duncan Kennedy, relying upon Rudolph von Ihering's Spirit of Roman Law, uses "the
determination of legal capacity by sole reference to age as a prime example of a formally realizable"
rule. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685,
1687-88 (1976).
37. Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE
L.J. 1, 4 (1992) (describing the reasonableness standard as an example of an indeterminate rule,
which is characterized as "usually open-textured, flexible, multi-factored, and fluid"). All rules may
be at least somewhat indeterminate due to the "open texture" nature of language. H. L. A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 120 (1963); see also BRIAN Bix, LAW, LANGUAGE, AND LEGAL DETERMINACY 7-
35 (1993) (discussing Hart's "open texture" concept).
38. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Ken Kress, Against Legal Principles, in LAW AND
INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 279 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995), reprinted in 82
IOWA L. REV. 739, 740-43 (1997) (explaining that standards or principles are different from rules
and are less desirable than rules); Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14,
25, 27 (1967) (contrasting rules, which apply in an "all-or-nothing fashion" if certain conditions are
met, with standards or principles, which "do not set out legal consequences that follow automatically
when the conditions provided are met" and possess the "dimension of weight or importance"); Louis
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 586-96 (1992) (dis-
cussing the relative economic cost of rules versus standards); Kennedy, supra note 36, at 1687-1701
(discussing the difference between "a formally realizable rule" and "a standard or principle or poli-
cy").
39. See John A. Miller, Indeterminacy, Complexity, and Fairness: Justifying Rule Simplifica-
tion in the Law of Taxation, 68 WASH. L. REV. 1, 78 (1993).
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I argue below that many of the rules for determining the immigra-
tion consequences of crimes are examples of complex rules that generate
predictable results. In many cases, the immigration consequences are
virtually certain but the analysis needed to arrive at this conclusion re-
quires either multiple steps or a more nuanced understanding of immigra-
tion law, or both. If Padilla were to limit the Sixth Amendment duty to
only readily ascertainable immigration consequences, defense attorneys
would not be required to advise their clients of entire classes of virtually
certain outcomes.
II.COMPLEX BUT INCREASINGLY CLEAR RULES
Rules at the intersection of immigration and criminal law (some-
times referred to as "crimmigration" law) illustrate how a body of com-
plex law can generate predictable results.40 In this Part, I explain the
complexity of this area of the law as well as its increasing determinacy.
A. Complexity
The rules governing the immigration consequences of crimes have
many of the attributes associated with complexity. The criminal grounds
of removal in the Immigration and Nationality Act are numerous, and
case law plays a significant role in defining the scope of these grounds.
People with lawful immigration status-including longtime lawful per-
manent residents-face deportation based on a wide range of criminal
convictions, from murder to nonviolent misdemeanor offenses. 41 Some
grounds of removal contain multiple subsections or cross-reference other
statutory provisions that contain multiple subsections.4 2 The aggravated
40. Juliet Stumpf coined this term. See Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants,
Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 376 (2006). A sampling of the crimmigration
scholarship includes: Jennifer M. Chac6n, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L.
REV. SIDEBAR 135 (2009); Nora V. Demleitner, Immigration Threats and Rewards: Effective Law
Enforcement Tools in the "War" on Terrorism?, 51 EMORY L.J. 1059 (2002); Daniel Kanstroom,
Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post-September IIth "Pale of Law," 29
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 639 (2004); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration
Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469 (2007);
Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 619-20 (2003); Maureen A. Sweeney, Fact or Fiction: The Legal Construc-
tion of Immigration Removal for Crimes, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 47, 61 (2010); Yolanda Vizquez,
Perpetuating the Marginalization of Latinos: A Collateral Consequence of the Incorporation of
Immigration Law into the Criminal Justice System, 54 How. L.J. 639 (2011); and Ingrid Eagly,
Prosecuting Immigration, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 1281 (2010).
41. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2015) (criminal grounds of deportation); id § 182(a)(2)
(criminal grounds of inadmissibility).
42. See, e.g., id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(1) (crimes against moral turpitude); id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iv)
(high speed flight); id. § I227(a)(2)(A)(v) (failure to register as a sex offender); id
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (controlled substances); id. § 1227(a)(2)(C) (certain firearm offenses); id
§ 1227(a)(2)(D) (miscellaneous crimes). Noncitizens can be removed for having an aggravated
felony conviction, which contains numerous subsections. See, e.g., id. § I 101(a)(43)(B) (illicit
trafficking in a controlled substance); id. §1 101(a)(43)(C) (illicit trafficking in firearms or destruc-
tive devices); id. § I 101(a)(43)(D) (money laundering); id § 1101 (a)(43)(E) (explosive materials
and firearms offenses); id. § I 101(a)(43)(F) (crime of violence); id. § I l01(a)(43)(H) (ransom of-
fenses); id. § I l01(a)(43)(1) (child pornography); id. § I l01(a)(43)(J) (corrupt organizations and
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felony ground of removal, for example, incorporates the definition of
aggravated felony, which contains twenty-seven subsections describing
different types of qualifying offenses, many of which are defined by
cross-reference to other federal statutes.43
Removal grounds are broken down into two types: the grounds of
inadmissibility and the grounds of deportation." The grounds of inad-
missibility apply when a noncitizen seeks admission at the border or to
"adjust status" to that of a lawful permanent resident while in the United
States.45 Inadmissibility grounds also apply to people who entered the
country without inspection or who overstayed a temporary grant of "pa-
role" to the United States.46 In contrast, the grounds of deportation apply
when U.S. immigration authorities seek to remove a person inside the
United States who has lawful status or who was admitted to the country
*47
on a nonimmigrant visa.
A removal ground is usually based on a type of crime, sometimes in
combination with the length of a sentence. Application of the statutory
reference to sentences is usually straightforward. The term "sentence" is
statutorily defined and includes suspended sentences. 4 8 The removal
grounds refer variously to the possible sentence, the sentence actually
imposed, or the sentence actually served.49 Determinations based on a
sentence can fairly be regarded as simple while "type of crime" determi-
nations can be much more difficult. Because our nation is composed of
fifty states, each with its own criminal code, it would be impractical for
immigration law to reference state criminal statutes. Instead, the grounds
employ a federal standard against which state convictions are judged. As
mentioned above, some grounds of removal cross-reference a federal
definition. For example, the "crime of violence" aggravated felony
ground cross-references the term "crime of violence" at 18 U.S.C. § 16.5o
Other grounds, in contrast, use phrases like "theft," "fraud," "burglary,"
gambling offenses); id. § ll01(a)(43)(K)(ii) (prostitute transportation); id § 1101(a)(43)(K)(iii)
(trafficking in persons); id. § I 101(a)(43)(L) (security related crimes); id. § I 101(a)(43)(M)(ii) (tax
evasion); id. § I l01(a)(43)(N) (alien smuggling); id. § I l01(a)(43)(0) (improper entry by an alien
previously deported); id. § 1101 (a)(43)(P)(i) (document fraud).
43. See id. § I 101(a)(43). For example, the drug trafficking aggravated felony ground refer-
ences two federal criminal statutes. Id. § I 101 (a)(43)(B).
44. For the grounds of inadmissibility, see id § I 182(a). For grounds of deportation, see id.
§ 1227(a).
45. Id. § 1255(a)(2) (stating that to qualify for adjustment of status an applicant must be
"admissible to the United States").
46. Id. § II 82(a)(6)(A)(i) ("An alien present in the United States without being admitted or
paroled, or who arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the
Attorney General, is inadmissible."); § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) (rendering inadmissible any noncitizen
"not in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing identification
card, or other valid entry document required by this chapter").
47. See id. § 1227(a).
48. Id. § I 101(a)(48)(B).
49. See id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(ll); id. § 11 82(a)(2)(A)(ii)(Hl).
50. See id. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).
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or "involving moral turpitude," which refer to generic offenses whose
elements are defined by federal case law.
The complexity of this area of law stems not only from the multi-
plicity of statutory references but also from the methodology used to
determine whether a particular conviction falls within a removal ground.
With limited exceptions, what is now commonly referred to as the "cate-
gorical approach" governs the determination of whether a particular of-
fense, state or federal, triggers removal.52 The approach is rooted in over
a century of federal and agency case law and practice.53 Since the early
twentieth century, courts have emphasized the importance of a single
methodology for judging the nature of a conviction and have based de-
portation not on underlying conduct but the elements necessary to consti-
54tute the crime. After the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) was es-
tablished in 1940, it repeatedly endorsed the approach begun by federal
courts. 5
The categorical analysis rests on the bedrock principles that fairness
requires that immigrants convicted of the same offenses be treated uni-
formly, immigration adjudicators are not triers of underlying facts of
convictions, and adjudication of immigration cases should be efficient
and not involve minitrials on the stale facts underlying a criminal case.
The categorical approach takes as its focus the elements of the offense.
Elements are essential facts, defined by statute and case law, which the
jury must find "unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt" in order to
convict.57 Facts about which jurors can disagree but still convict are
means by which the crime could have been committed rather than ele-
ments. Under the categorical approach, to say that someone can be re-
moved under our immigration law because of a conviction is to say that
the person is being removed based on the elements of the offense.
The manner in which a defendant was alleged to have committed
the elements of the crime is irrelevant. The only relevant conduct is the
"the least of th[e] acts criminalized." 59 In applying this "minimum con-
51. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i); id. § I 101(a)(43)(A); id. § I 101(a)(43)(G), (M).
52. Legal scholars have discussed the origins of the categorical approach. See Alina Das, The
Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting Categorical Analysis in Immigration
Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1677 (2011); Jennifer Lee Koh, The Whole Better than the Sum: A
Case for the Categorical Approach to Determining the Immigration Consequences of Crime, 26
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 260 (2012); Rebecca Sharpless, Toward a True Elements Test: Taylor and
the Categorical Analysis of Crimes in Immigration Law, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979, 994-96 (2008).
53. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1685 (2013) ("This categorical approach has a
long pedigree in our Nation's immigration law." (citing Das, supra note 52, at 1688-702, 1749-52)).
54. See Sharpless, supra note 52, at 1008.
55. See id. at 995-97.
56. See Koh, supra note 52, at 267.
57. Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2288 (2013).
58. Id.
59. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684 (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v.
United States, 559 U.S. 133, 137 (2010) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
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duct" test, the adjudicator reviews the universe of conduct made culpable
under the statute and determines whether that universe is broader than
the universe of culpable conduct defined by the pertinent federal stand-
ard.60 For example, in cases involving fraud, the adjudicator asks whether
the state definition of fraud, as it appears in the relevant criminal statute
and case law, is broader than the federal definition. If the state definition
of fraud criminalizes conduct that does not qualify as federal fraud, the
state offense would not be a categorical match with the federal standard
under the minimum conduct test and would not trigger deportation. The
minimum conduct test ensures that when the immigration statute hinges
consequences on a conviction rather than conduct, immigration adjudica-
tors are not the triers of fact in the first instance. Rather, they rule only
on the legal question of whether the conviction-as determined by the
criminal justice system-falls within a removal ground.61
In 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States62 adopt-
ed the categorical approach as the methodology for evaluating whether
prior crimes qualify as predicate offenses for federal sentencing en-
hancements. 63 Defense attorneys who practice in federal court thus rou-
tinely apply the categorical approach in their practice. States also employ
analogs to the categorical approach in a variety of different criminal law
contexts, including habitualization sentencing. 4
Despite having pervaded immigration law jurisprudence since the
earliest of immigration decisions, the categorical approach has historical-
ly frustrated immigration and federal courts. The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit lamented in 2011 that "[i]n the twenty years since
[the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in] Taylor," it has "struggled to un-
derstand the contours of the Supreme Court's" categorical approach,
pronouncing that "over the past decade ... no other area of the law has
demanded more of [the court's] resources."65 Commentators have char-
acterized the categorical approach as complex, controversial, and confus-
ing. "One scholar [has] compared the categorical approach to property
law's rule against perpetuities in terms of its complexity, . . . not[ing]
that '[e]ven lawyers who regularly practice [in the area] can struggle to
60. The minimum conduct test surfaces whenever an adjudicator is asked to assess whether a
conviction falls within a definition, be it the definition of an element of a crime (e.g., fraud) or a
definition of a category of offenses that trigger deportation (e.g., crime involving moral turpitude).
The U.S. Supreme Court stated in Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez that adjudicators cannot engage in
"legal imagination" when determining the universe of conduct made culpable under the statute but
must point to cases to show that the language of a statute has been interpreted to apply to the scenar-
io at issue. 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007).
61. See Sharpless, supra note 52, at 979-80.
62. 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
63. Id. at 602.
64. See, e.g., State v. Hearns, 961 So. 2d 211, 212 (Fla. 2007) (holding that when determining
whether a prior conviction constituted a forcible felony, the only relevant consideration is the ele-
ments of the offense).
65. United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
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understand the doctrine and its occasionally perplexing results.""6 The
Supreme Court has noted that "the categorical method is not always easy
to apply. . . . because sometimes a separately numbered subsection of a
criminal statute will refer to several different crimes, each described sep-
arately." 67 Perhaps in part because of this complexity, the BIA, and some
federal courts of appeals, had retreated from the strict categorical ap-
proach before the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed its saliency.68
A primary thesis of this Article is that these admittedly complicated
rules governing the immigration consequences of crimes have become
better defined and determinate in recent years.
B. Predictability
In the years since Taylor, the U.S. Supreme Court has weighed in at
least fourteen times to clarify ambiguity in the rules that immigration
adjudicators and federal sentencing judges must follow when applying
the categorical approach. 6 9 The Court's decisions have significantly in-
creased the ability of lawyers to predict the immigration consequences of
a plea, making the immigration analysis of crimes more akin to a logic
puzzle that is difficult but has a clear answer. To borrow from Duncan
Kennedy's typology of rules, the rules governing removal for a crime
have become more "formally realizable."7 0
Historically, the BIA, the U.S. Attorney General, and some lower
federal courts had introduced dissonance in the law regarding the cate-
gorical approach, even going so far as to permit review of extrinsic evi-
dence to determine whether a person could be removed under certain
grounds.7 ' The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has now definitively ruled
66. Jennifer Lee Koh, Rethinking Removability, 65 FLA. L. REv. 1803, 1834 (2013) (third and
fourth alterations in original) (quoting Doug Keller, Causing Mischief for Taylor 's Categorical
Approach: Applying "Legal Imagination" to Duenas-Alvarez, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 625, 625
(2011)).
67. Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 35 (2009) (discussing James v United States, 550 U.S.
192 (2007), overruled by Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015)).
68. See infra note 71.
69. Johnson v. U.S. 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015); Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1986-
1991 (2015); United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1408 (2014); Descamps v. United States,
133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013); Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684-85 (2013); Kawashima
v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1166 (2012); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010); Johnson v.
United States, 559 U.S. 133, 144 (2010); Nihawan, 557 U.S. at 32; Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez,
549 U.S. 183, 185-86 (2007); James, 550 U.S. at 208; Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 50-51
(2006); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 3-4
(2004).
70. Duncan Kennedy describes formal realizability as "describ[ing] the degree to which a
legal directive has the quality of 'ruleness,"' namely the degree to which an official following the
rule acts based on "the presence together of each of a list of easily distinguishable factual aspects of
a situation by intervening in a determinate way." Kennedy, supra note 36, at 1687-88. He credits
Rudolph von lhering in Spirit ofRoman Law for the term. Id. at 1687.
71. U.S. Attorney General Mukasey ruled in 2008 that the government may, in some cases, go
beyond the categorical approach to look at evidence outside the record of conviction in order to
determine removability under the crime involving moral turpitude grounds of removal. See Silva-
Trevino, 24 1. & N. Dec. 687, 708 (U.S. Atty. Gen. 2008), vacated, 26 1. & N. Dec. 550 (2015). See
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
that the categorical approach applies with only limited exceptions and
has clarified the rules for applying the methodology.72 In Moncrieffe v.
Holder,7 3 the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that the strict categorical ap-
proach governs the determination of whether a conviction falls within a
removal ground.74 The Court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit to hold that a state statute criminalizing possession of mari-
juana with intent to distribute is not a "drug trafficking" aggravated felo-
ny under immigration law when the statute includes conduct-namely
social sharing of marijuana-that falls outside the federal definition of
drug trafficking. In response to the Court's ruling, the BIA and lower
courts reversed their courses straying from the categorical approach.76
The Supreme Court has further engendered determinacy by recon-
ciling divergent views about when statutes can be deemed to contain
multiple crimes such that the adjudicator can look beyond the statute of
conviction and review the record of conviction, a methodology called the
modified categorical approach. In the past, lower courts and the BIA
were divided about when an adjudicator could look beyond the statute to
review the record of conviction when determining whether a conviction
was a categorical match with the relevant federal removal ground.7 8 In
the majority of cases, recourse to the record of conviction was appropri-
ate only if the statute defined multiple crimes, and the record could es-
tablish which set of elements were the elements of conviction. 79 In other
cases, however, courts sanctioned reliance on nonelement facts that ap-
peared in the record of conviction.80 The BIA and several circuits, in-
cluding the Ninth Circuit, had permitted review of the record of convic-
generally MANNY VARGAS ET AL., MONCRiEFFE V. HOLDER: IMPLICATIONS FOR DRUG CHARGES
AND OTHER ISSUES INVOLVING THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH, LEGAL ACTION CENTER 10-13 (May
2, 2013), available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/moncrieffe-v-holder-
implicationsfordrugchargesand other categorical approach issues_5-1-13_fin.pdf.
72. Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1684-85. The Court has thus overruled U.S. courts of appeals
precedent. See, e.g., Garcia v. Holder, 638 F.3d 511, 514 (6th Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2019
(2013); Juice v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 30, 35-36 (1st Cir. 2008), abrogated by Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct.
1678.
73. 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013).
74. Id. at 1684-85.
75. Id at 1682, 1684.
76. See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Cordero, 723 F.3d 1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 2013) (recogniz-
ing that United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), was abro-
gated by Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013)). On April 10, 2015, the U.S. Attorney
General Eric H. Holder vacated Silva-Trevino in light of Moncrieffe and other Supreme Court cases.
See Silva-Trevino, 24 1. & N. Dec. 687, 708 (U.S. Atty. Gen. 2008), vacated, 26 1. & N. Dec. 550
(2015); see generally, VARGAS ET AL., supra note 71, at 10-13.
77. In Descamps, the Court reconciled divergent approaches to the modified categorical
approach. 133 S. Ct. at 2282-83 & n.l (comparing Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d at 940, and
United States v. Armstead, 467 F.3d 943, 947-50 (6th Cir. 2006), abrogated by Descamps, 133 S.
Ct. at 2292, with United States v. Beardsley, 691 F.3d 252, 268-74 (2d Cir. 2012), and United States
v. Giggey, 551 F.3d 27, 40 (1st Cir. 2008) (en banc)).
78. Descamps, 133 S. Ct at 2282-83.
79. Sharpless, supra note 52, at 996-99.
80. See id at 1030.
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tion in a broad range of circumstances.8 ' The Court in Moncrieffe set
these courts straight, stating that the modified categorical approach is
appropriate only if a "state statute[] . . . contain[s] several different
crimes, each described separately." 82 Because the statute under which
Moncrieffe had been convicted was not divisible in this way, the Court
refrained from reviewing the record of conviction to see how much mari-
juana was alleged to have been in Moncrieffe's possession and whether
the distribution was for remuneration.8 3
Shortly after deciding Moncrieffe, the Court squarely addressed the
issue of when a criminal statute is divisible such that immigration judges
and other adjudicators can consult the record of conviction under the
modified categorical approach. Descamps v. United States84 -a federal
sentencing enhancement case-involved the issue of whether the federal
government could seek to enhance a sentence under the Armed Career
Criminal Act based on Descamps's prior state convictions, including a
California conviction for burglary that the government contended was
equivalent to federally defined generic burglary.85 The issue was whether
the California burglary conviction could serve as a predicate for en-
hancement because it did not require "unlawful entry," an element of
generic burglary as defined by the Court in Taylor v. United States.86 The
sentencing judge had found that the conviction could be the basis for
enhancement after reviewing the underlying record of conviction and
finding that Descamps had admitted to an unlawful entry as a factual
basis for the plea.87 The Supreme Court, however, held that the sentenc-
ing judge should not have reviewed the record of conviction because the
California burglary statute contained only a single set of elements." The
modified categorical approach, the Court found, is simply a "tool" to
"identify, from among several alternatives, the crime of conviction so
that the court can compare it to the generic offense." 89 The Court's deci-
81. See, e.g., United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915, 937 (9th Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (permitting the modified categorical approach if the theory of the prosecution "necessarily
rested" on a facts that "satisfy the elements of the generic offense") (internal quotation marks omit-
ted); Lanferman, 25 1. & N. Dec. at 722 ("[A]ll statutes of conviction [are divisible] . . . regardless of
their structure, so long as they contain an element or elements that could be satisfied either by re-
movable or non-removable conduct." (second alteration in original) (quoting Lanferman v. B.I.A.,
576 F.3d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
82. 133 S. Ct. at 1684.
83. See id. at 1685-86.
84. 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013).
85. Id. at 2281.
86. Id. at 2282; 495 U.S. 575, 577-78 (1990).
87. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2282.
88. Id. at 2283 (holding that "the modified categorical approach" does not apply to statutes
"that contain a single, 'indivisible' set of elements sweeping more broadly than the corresponding
generic offense.").
89. Id. at 2285.
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sions directly overruled contrary decisions from several circuit courts. 90
The BIA subsequently issued a precedent decision retreating from its
former position and aligning with Moncrieffe and Descamps.
The Court has also settled any lingering doubt about whether the
categorical approaches used in the federal recidivist sentencing and im-
migration contexts are one and the same. The BIA had previously found
that "the categorical approach itself need not be applied with the same
rigor in the immigration context as in the criminal arena." 92 Some court
of appeals decisions had adopted similar positions.9 3 In Moncrieffe, how-
ever, the Court made clear that the methodologies are identical in both
immigration and criminal resentencing law.94 By citing indiscriminately
to both immigration and criminal precedent when elucidating the cate-
gorical approach, the Court demonstrated that the methodology is the
same in both contexts.9 5 The BIA subsequently acknowledged this unity
of approaches. 96
The Court has also provided guidance on the limited circumstances
in which the categorical approach does not apply. In Nijhawan v. Hold-
er, 97 the Court considered the aggravated felony ground of removal en-
compassing "an offense that . . . involves fraud or deceit in which the
loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000."98 The question before the
Court was whether the "loss to the victim" language referred to "an ele-
ment of the fraud or deceit" crime or the "particular circumstances in
which an offender committed a (more broadly defined) fraud or deceit
crime on a particular occasion."99 In finding the latter, the Court rein-
forced that the categorical approach applies to the threshold question of
whether an offense involved an element of fraud or deceit. The Court
listed the many aggravated felony provisions requiring the categorical
90. See, e.g., United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915, 946 (9th Cir. 2011) (en
banc), abrogated by Descamps, 133 S. Ct. 2276; United States v. Armstead, 467 F.3d 943, 948 (6th
Cir. 2006), abrogated by Descamps, 133 S. Ct. 2276.
91. Chairez-Castrejon, 26 1. & N. Dec. 349, 349, 352-54 (B.l.A. 2014), partially vacated by
Chairez-Castrejon, 26 1. & N. Dec. 478 (B.I.A. 2015) (overruling Lanferman, 25 1. & N. Dec. 721).
The U.S. Attorney General has stayed this decision pending her resolution of whether Descamps
requires juror unanimity for a fact to be treated as an element rather than a means of committing a
crime. Chairez-Castrejon, 26 1. & N. Dec. 686 (Att'y Gen. 2015). See infra note 102.
92. Lanferman, 25 1. & N. Dec. at 728.
93. See, e.g., Bobadilla v. Holder, 679 F.3d 1052, 1056-58 & n.3 (8th Cir. 2012); Ali v.
Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737, 741-42 (7th Cir. 2008); Conteh v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 45, 55-56 (1st Cir.
2006).
94. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1685 (2013).
95. Id. at 1684 (citing immigration cases: Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009), Gonzales
v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007), and Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005), along
with criminal sentencing case Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010)). The Court has recog-
nized that the term "crime of violence" in 18 U.S.C. § 16 must be interpreted uniformly in both
criminal and noncriminal contexts. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004).
96. Chairez-Castrejon, 26 1. & N. Dec. at 353-54 ("Descamps itself makes no distinction
between the criminal and immigration contexts.").
97. 557 U.S. 29 (2009).
98. Id. at 32 (alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43)(M)(i)).
99. Id.
948 [Vol. 92:4
2015] CLEAR AND SIMPLE DEPORTATION RULES FOR CRIMES 949
approach, reaffirming its commitment to it. 1  Later, in Moncrieffe, the
Court further emphasized the limited role for the circumstance-specific
approach by excoriating "post hoc investigation[s] into the facts of predi-
cate offenses" and "minitrials conducted long after the fact."'
0
'
While the Court has not definitively resolved every open question
relating to the categorical approach, it has settled many of the debates
among the BIA and lower courts.' 02 The rules for determining whether a
criminal conviction falls within a ground of removal are now sufficiently
clear to generate predictable results in most cases.
100. Id. at 37. For a chart mapping the aggravated felony provisions and whether Nijhawan
designated them as requiring the categorical or circumstance-specific approach, see DAN
KESSELBRENNER ET AL., NAT'L IMMIGRATION PROJECT, THE IMPACT OF NIJHAWAN V. HOLDER ON
APPLICATION OF THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH TO AGGRAVATED FELONY DETERMINATIONS app. at
8-15 (2009), available at
http://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/legalresources/cd paNijhawan%20and%20the%20Cate
gorical%20Approach%20-%20NIPNLG%20and%201DP%20-%202009.pdf.
101. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1690 (2013).
102. Several areas of confusion persist. The Court has stated that, when applying the minimum
conduct test, noncitizens must demonstrate a "realistic probability" that a state would actually prose-
cute behavior that renders a state statute broader than the relevant federal standard. Moncrieffe, 133
S. Ct. at 1684-85 (quoting Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)). See also Fer-
reira, 26 1. & N. Dec. 415 (B.I.A. 2014) (a noncitizen must provide evidence of actual prosecutions
to satisfy the "realistic probability" test). The standard for what counts as a "realistic probability" is
unclear. See ANDREW WACHTENHEIM ET AL., NAT'L IMMIGRATION PROJECT, THE REALISTIC
PROBABILITY STANDARD: FIGHTING GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO USE IT TO UNDERMINE THE
CATEGORICAL APPROACH (2014). A second dispute involves the question of who wins when there is
ambiguity about whether a conviction falls within a removal ground. The government has the burden
of establishing deportability for a crime, whereas the noncitizen has the burden of proof to establish
eligibility for relief from removal. See Nifhawan, 557 U.S. at 42. Some forms of relief are unavaila-
ble to noncitizens who have been convicted of a certain type of crime, like an aggravated felony. See
id at 41-42. The BIA and some federal courts have held that even if the government could not meet
its burden of establishing deportability for a particular crime, the crime could render the noncitizen
ineligible for relief. See, e.g., Young v. Holder, 697 F.3d 976, 989-90 (9th Cir. 2012), abrogated by
Almanza-Arenas v. Holder, 771 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2014), rehearing en banc granted, 785 F.3d 366
(2015); Salem v. Holder, 647 F.3d Ill, 120 (4th Cir. 2011); Garcia v. Holder, 584 F.3d 1288, 1290
(10th Cir. 2009); Almanza-Arenas, 24 1. & N. Dec. 771, 775-76 (B.I.A. 2009). The Supreme Court's
discussion in Moncrieffe characterizing the categorical analysis of crimes as a legal, rather than a
factual, inquiry may settle this dispute by clarifying that the burden of proof for factual and eviden-
tiary matters does not apply. Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1684-86. Lastly, a circuit split exists regard-
ing what qualifies as an element of a crime, as opposed to the means by which a crime was commit-
ted. Ifjurors need not agree about certain alleged facts, then the facts are means, not elements. Some
circuits, however, have held that a statute's use of a list or "or" language definitively establishes
multiple sets of elements such that the modified categorical approach applies, even if jurors need not
agree on how the crime was committed. Compare United States v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485 (4th Cir.
2015); Rendon v. Holder, 764 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2014), rehearing en banc denied, 782 F.3d 466
(9th Cir. 2015), United States v. Estrella, 758 F.3d 1239, 1246 (1 ith Cir. 2014) (following juror
agreement test), with United States v. Trent, 767 F.3d 1046 (10th Cir. 2014); United States v. Ozier,
796 F.3d 597 (6th Cir. 2015) (declining to follow juror agreement test). The U.S. Attorney General
has vacated and certified to herself the BIA's decision in Chairez-Castrejon, a decision adopting the
juror agreement test for any circuit that had not held otherwise. Chairez-Castrejon, 26 1. & N. Dec.
349, 349, 352-54 (B.I.A. 2014), partially vacated by Chairez-Castrejon, 26 1. & N. Dec. 478 (B.I.A.
2015), stayedandcertifiedby Chairez-Castrejon, 26 1. & N. Dec. 686 (Att'y Gen. 2015).
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III. THE CASE FOR SIMPLER RULES
I have argued that the relative simplicity or complexity of a legal
inquiry should not define the scope of defense counsel's Padilla duty,
that defense attorneys must counsel their clients about predictable immi-
gration consequences, and that the admittedly complex area of law gov-
erning immigration consequences of crimes is now producing determi-
nate results. Although simplicity cannot be the standard for measuring
compliance with Padilla, simplifying the law would have positive, trans-
formative effects.
Society stands to gain when the government minimizes the amount
of human capital needed to run an effective legal system.'0 3 Congress
rightly strives to make rules understandable by nonexperts, as it did in
the Plain Writing Act of 2 0 10 .H At the same time, some degree of com-
plexity is inevitable because precision sometimes requires it.' 05 Moreo-
ver, "institutions" tend to "slowly creep toward complexity" because,
over time, the aggregation of small additions to a legal regime becomes
"unwieldy."' 06 The critical task is thus to determine the optimal degree of
complexity.1 07 In the context of immigration law and crimes, simpler
rules would have numerous salutary effects, including enabling the im-
plementation of Padilla; enhancing the legitimacy of immigration law by
ensuring understandability, notice, and fairness; and increasing adminis-
trative and judicial efficiency. Moreover, as illustrated below, the com-
plexity of the current scheme could be eliminated without sacrificing
predictable results.
103. Daniel Katz and M. J. Bommarito define complexity as the amount of "human capital
expended by a society when an end user is required to review and assimilate a body of legal rules."
Daniel Martin Katz & M. J. Bommarito II, Measuring the Complexity of the Law: The United States
Code, 22 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 337, 340 (2014).
104. Plain Writing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-274, § 2, 124 Stat. 2861, 2861 (2010) ("The
purpose of this Act is to improve the effectiveness and accountability of Federal agencies to the
public by promoting clear Government communication that the public can understand and use."); see
also 5 U.S.C. § 301 (2015); Eric Kades, The Laws of Complexity and the Complexity of Laws: The
Implications of Computational Complexity Theory for the Law, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 403, 413-14
(1997) (arguing that Congress has an obligation to draft the rule in a way that persons of reasonable
intelligence can understand); Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, When Laws Become Too Com-
plex, GOV.UK (Apr. 16, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/govemment/publications/when-laws-become-
too-complex/when-laws-become-too-complex.
105. See Kades, supra note 104, at 412 ("[T]he usual cure for indeterminacy ... may itself
introduce further complexity."); Miller, supra note 39, at 7 (noting that the "use of elaborative com-
plexity to achieve fairness in tax law has been debated"). See generally Byron Holz, Chaos Worth
Having: Irreducible Complexity and Pragmatic Jurisprudence, 8 MINN. J.L. SC. & TECH. 303, 333
(2007); Schuck, supra note 37; R. George Wright, The Illusion of Simplicity: An Explanation of Why
the Law Can't Just Be Less Complex, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 715, 717 (2000).
106. Katz & Bommarito, supra note 103, at 339.
107. See Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 150, 150-51 (1995); Gordon Tullock, On the Desirable Degree of Detail in the Law, 2 EUR.
J.L. & ECON. 199, 202 (1995).
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A. Implementation ofPadilla
The enactment of simple rules would greatly facilitate implementa-
tion of Padilla.0 8 Simple rules would increase both the quantity and
quality of defense lawyer counseling about immigration consequences.
Counseling based on simple rules is undeniably easier for lawyers to
communicate and easier for clients to understand.
The post-Padilla practices of public defender offices illustrate this
point. Public defender offices have taken a variety of approaches to im-
plementing the Padilla decision, some more successfully than others.' 09
In a limited number of venues, the office of the public defender has im-
migration specialists on staff and has routinized the screening of cases in
which the defendant is a noncitizen.110 In others, individual lawyers are
expected to learn the relevant immigration law themselves, sometimes
assisted by office trainings or outside consultants."'
A common strategy for dealing with difficult problems is to use a
heuristic device as a shortcut. In the context of immigration consequenc-
es of crimes, such tools are typically lists of common crimes and their
usual immigration consequences.11 2 As with other heuristic devices, lists
work well in some scenarios but also lead to errors.11 3 Moreover, lists of
crimes that trigger immigration consequences do nothing to help a de-
fense attorney identify what category of consequences are relevant to a
particular client's case.1 4 For example, a list will never tell a defense
108. For a discussion of the challenges in implementing Padilla, see Maureen A. Sweeney,
Where Do We Go from Padilla v. Kentucky? Thoughts on Implementation and Future Directions, 45
NEW ENG. L. REV. 353, 357-65 (2011).
109. For a blueprint of how offices could choose to implement Padilla, see PETER L.
MARKOWITZ, IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT & N.Y. STATE DEFENDERS ASS'N, PROTOCOL FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT OF A PUBLic DEFENDER IMMIGRATION SERVICE PLAN 22-23 (2009), available at
http://immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Protocol.pdf.
110. See id.
Ill. See id.
112. For examples of charts on immigration consequences of criminal convictions, see Legal
Resources, NAT'L IMMIGRATION PROJECT,
http://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/legalresources.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2015).
113. The disclaimers on charts by reputable immigration attorneys reflect their limitations. See,
e.g., Dan Kesselbrenner & Sandy Lin, Selected Immigration Consequences of Certain Federal
Offenses, NAT'L IMMIGRATION PROJECT 1 (2010),
http://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/legalresources/fedchart_2010%20update.pdf; Maureen
Sweeney, Immigration Consequences of Maryland Offenses, U. MD. FRANCIS KING CAREY SCH. L.
1-2, http://www.law.umaryland.edulfaculty/Msweeney/ImmigrationConsequencesChart.pdf (last
updated Aug. 3, 2015).
114. See Andres Benach, Sejal Zota & Maria Navarro, How Much to Advise: What are the
Requirements of Padilla v. Kentucky, 2013 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. I (discussing the Padilla duty as
including investigating "the immigration status and criminal history of the defendant" and "the
specific immigration consequences that the proposed plea would have on the particular individual"
as well as "encompass[ing] both avoiding [the defendant] becoming removable and preserving
eligibility to apply for relief from removal"). Under reputable post-Padilla protocols, defense attor-
neys are instructed to determine their client's (1) immigration status, if any, and when it was ob-
tained; (2) prior criminal history; and (3) eligibility for immigration relief. Id. Only with this infor-
mation can attorneys convey an accurate immigration consequences evaluation and effectively plea
bargain. See, e.g., MANUEL D. VARGAS, IMMIGRANT DEE. PROJECT, DUTY OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE
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attorney whether a particular client should be concerned about pleading
guilty to an aggravated felony, a crime involving moral turpitude, or
both.
The degree to which offices have taken Padilla on board varies
widely. Some offices have model programs with immigration specialists
on staff, while others have only begun to grapple with Padilla implemen-
tation.115 The crushing caseload of some public defender offices makes
Padilla implementation a particular challenge." 6 Even in offices with
immigration specialists, however, attorneys struggle to ensure that each
and every noncitizen defendant receives advice and that the advice is
accurate and complete.'1 7 Regardless of an attorney's level of success in
implementing Padilla, he or she would stand to gain from simpler depor-
tation rules.
B. Transparency, Legitimacy, and Notice
The complicated deportation rules of today render inaccessible the
reasoning behind our government's choices about whom to deport. When
the rules for how the system seeks to treat like cases alike are hard to
explain, the public's confidence in the deportation system declines." 8
Decisions appear arbitrary rather than rule bound. Simple rules are more
readily recognized as transparent than complex rules and therefore re-
garded as more legitimate. 119
Simple rules about what convictions trigger removal or ineligibility
for immigration status would greatly enhance the general public's under-
standing of the law and their confidence in the immigration system. Such
rules would also more effectively put noncitizens on notice of what
counts as a basis for being deported or denied immigration status. Immi-
COUNSEL REPRESENTING AN IMMIGRANT DEFENDANT AFTER PADILLA V. KENTUCKY (2010), availa-
ble at http://immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/PadillaPractice Advisory_O1 1712FINAL.pdf.
115. MARKOWITZ, supra note 109.
116. See Malia Brink, A Gauntlet Thrown: The Transformative Potential of Padilla v. Ken-
tucky, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 39, 53-61 (2011) (discussing effect of high public defender caseloads
on implementation of Padilla); Gabriel J. Chin, Making Padilla Practical: Defense Counsel and
Collateral Consequences at Guilty Plea, 54 HOW. L.J. 675, 678-81 (2011) (discussing the impact of
high caseloads and lack of funding on the ability of public defender offices to deliver Padilla ad-
vice); L. Jay Jackson, Miami-Dade's Overburdened PD's Office May Decline New Clients, Florida
Court Says, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 1, 2013, 8:50 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/miami-
dadesoverburdenedpds office maydecline new-clients floridacourt s; Erik Eckholm, Citing
Workload, Public Lawyers Reject New Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2008, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/09/us/09defender.html?pagewanted=all.
117. For a discussion of the need to make information about immigration consequences acces-
sible to the defense bar, see Chin, supra note 116, at 684-88.
118. See Scott Dodson, The Complexity of-Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REv. 1, 8-9 (2011).
119. Id. at 8 (arguing that in the context of jurisdictional rules "[t]he transparent judicial en-
forcement of a clear statutory rule of jurisdiction negates the democratically problematic perception
of unauthorized judicial lawmaking."); Miller, supra note 39, at 21 (arguing that "the elaborative
complexity of tax law is justified by its certain and uniform fairness when applied by one who has
mastered it" but that "mastery of the rules is rendered extremely difficult" making it only possible
for the "elite" to understand, a result that "would strike many as unfair").
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gration adjudicators would also be properly incentivized to apply the
law. As discussed above, immigration adjudicators, the BIA, and federal
appellate courts had broken with the categorical approach and rendered a
significant number of result-driven decisions prior to the Supreme
Court's decisions in Moncrieffe and Descamps.120 The complexity of the
categorical approach may have made it easier for adjudicators to justify
decisions designed to rule against the convicted noncitizen, as complexi-
ty can be mistaken for ambiguity. A simple replacement rule for the cat-
egorical approach would be more likely to constrain adjudicators and
lead to more rule-bound decisions.121
C. Efficiency
Plain deportation rules would be easier to administer, resulting in
cost savings for the administrative and court systems as well as the
noncitizens embroiled in it. Litigation about the immigration conse-
quences of crimes consumes a significant portion of administrative and
federal court dockets.122 As mentioned above, the Ninth Circuit stated in
2011 that cases involving the categorical approach have taken up more of
the court's time than any other type of case.123
If the rules for determining deportation for a crime were more easily
understood and applied, attorneys would save time when advising their
clients and might pass these cost savings onto their clients. Judges would
adjudicate cases more accurately and quickly, and judges' caseloads
would be smaller because fewer people would be erroneously placed into
removal proceedings.1 24 Efficiencies would extend to savings on deten-
tion costs, as many immigration court cases involving the analysis of
crimes take place while the noncitizen is detained.
120. See supra notes 90-91.
121. Legal realists argue that judges do not follow rules when deciding cases. In this view, any
determinacy that exists in the law stems not from the clarity of a rule but from the ability to predict
what judges will do. Even if legal realism holds true as a general matter, it is difficult to see how
immigration judges could fail to follow a sentence-trigger deportation rule, at least without enor-
mous effort.
122. Between 2008 and 2012, the percent of deportation orders sought in immigration court
based on alleged criminal activity ranged from 17.5 percent to 14.3 percent. Deportation Orders
Sought in Immigration Court Based on Alleged Criminal Activity by Type, TRAC IMMIGRATION
(2012), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/281/include/depordertype.html.
123. United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 2011 ) (en banc).
124. An immigration judge, faced with making a determination about whether a hit and run
crime constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude, remarked, "I have gone back and forth on this
issue," and continued "[a]re these crimes of moral turpitude? This is tough." Eli Saslow, In a
Crowded Immigration Court, Seven Minutes to Decide a Family's Future, WASH. POST (Feb. 2,
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/in-a-crowded-immigration-court-seven-minutes-to-
decide-a-familys-future/2014/02/02/518c3e3e-8798-lIe3-a5bd-844629433ba3_story.htmi (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Judge Lawrence Burman of the Arlington Immigration Court).
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IV. WHY SIMPLE RULES ARE HARD TO GET
Despite the benefits of simple criminal deportation rules, numerous
barriers prevent their adoption, including a concern that any new legisla-
tion would be even more punitive than the current rules. Noncitizens
with criminal convictions might be collectively better off under the cur-
rent rules. As I argue below, the only way to significantly simplify the
rules would be to tag deportation to sentence length. Because of wide-
spread concerns about the fairness of sentencing practices, many rightly
view the use of time served in prison a problematic trigger for removal.
History teaches that noncitizens with criminal convictions lose
when Congress amends immigration law. Over the last three decades,
legislative reforms at the intersection of crimes and deportation have
increasingly expanded the reach of deportation for crimes and rolled
back defenses from deportation for those found removable.1 25 Congress
added the term "aggravated felony" to immigration law in 1988 and,
since then, has expanded it several times.126 As the Supreme Court noted
in Padilla, deportation is now "practically inevitable" for a wide range of
criminal offenses. 12 7
Given the history of progressively restrictive legislative amend-
ments, pro-immigrant reformers are legitimately concerned that any sim-
plification of the rules for deportation for a crime would be a net loss for
immigrants with a criminal conviction. If deportation were tied to sen-
tence length, the length of sentence that would be politically palatable as
a trigger would likely be unacceptably short. As a group, immigrants
with criminal convictions might be better off with the status quo.
One need look no further than the framing of the current debate on
immigration reform to understand the fears of pro-immigrant reformers.
The approach of the Obama Administration and mainstream immigration
reformers is to seek political gains for some immigrants by contrasting
them with immigrants who have been convicted of a crime. "Criminal
aliens" serve as foils for "good" immigrants, who are packaged as model
minorities.128 In announcing administrative immigration reform, for ex-
125. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 361-64 (2010) ("These changes to our immigration
law have dramatically raised the stakes of a noncitizen's criminal conviction.").
126. When the term "aggravated felony" was added to the INA in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469-70 (1988), it included murder, drug traf-
ficking, and illicit trafficking in firearms or destructive devices. In 1990, Congress expanded the
term in the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, §501, 104 Stat. 4978, 5048 (1990). In
1996, Congress added additional crimes to the definition in the Illegal Immigration and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, § 321(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
127. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 363-64. During oral argument in the 2001 case INS v. St. Cyr, one of
the justices expressed concern that stealing a pair of tennis shoes could be an aggravated felony.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 15-16, INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (No. 00-767), available
at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral arguments/argumenttranscripts/00-767.pdf.
128. See Rebecca Sharpless, "Immigrants Are Not Criminals": Respectability, Immigration
Reform, and Hyperincarceration, 53 HOUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
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ample, President Obama has framed the central tenet of his immigration
policy as deporting "[flelons, not families," thereby writing off convicted
noncitizens with U.S. citizen children or other family members in the
United States.129 Creating the political space for simple, yet not harsh,
deportation rules appears linked to the success of the broader movement
to dial back overly punitive laws and enforcement practices. 30
A second, formidable barrier to the adoption of a simple, sentence-
trigger deportation rule is a concern about disparities in sentencing prac-
tices across jurisdictions and along racial, ethnic, and gender lines. The
federal government keeps comprehensive statistics on federal sentencing
broken down by type of crime and district. The data show that average
sentences vary significantly by federal court district. For example, the
average prison sentence in 2012 in Colorado federal court was forty-six
months while it was twenty-nine months in the Southern District of Cali-
fornia. 131 The average sentence for drug trafficking in Colorado federal
court was seventy months, compared to forty-four months in the South-
ern District of California.' 32 Statistics on state court sentencing practices
also show that average time served varies significantly by jurisdiction. 3 3
Even more troubling is research showing that disparate sentencing
occurs on invidious grounds.' 34 The Sentencing and Corrections Working
Group of the Department of Justice has been charged with reviewing
"unwarranted racial and ethnic disparities in sentencing."'3 ' A 2004
129. Barack Obama, President, United States, Remarks by the President in Address to the
Nation on Immigration (Nov. 20, 2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/11/20/remarks-president-address-nation-immigration.
130. See Sharpless, supra note 128.
131. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'Ns, 2012 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
app. B (2013), available at http://www.ussc.gov/research-and-publications/annual-reports-
sourcebooks/2012/sourcebook-2012 (last visited Sept. 7, 2015).
132. Id The wide disparity of sentences by courts for the same or similar conduct was the
impetus behind creating the sentencing guidelines. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES
MANUAL § IAl.3 (2004) ("Congress sought uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide dispari-
ty in sentences imposed by different federal courts for similar criminal conduct by similar offend-
ers."). Notwithstanding the guidelines, sentencing disparities persist. See supra note 131 and accom-
panying text.
133. Using data from the National Corrections Reporting Program, the Pew Charitable Trusts
has calculated the average time served of released offenders in every state. THE PEW CTR. ON THE
STATES, TIME SERVED: THE HIGH COST, Low RETURN OF LONGER PRISON TERMS 11 (2012). The
statistics show that, for example, 2009 released offenders in Michigan who had committed violent
crimes had served an average of 7.6 years, whereas similarly situated released offenders in Colorado
had spent an average of 4.6 years imprisoned. Id. at 16.
134. See sources cited supra note 8.
135. Lanny A. Breuer, The Attorney General's Sentencing and Corrections Working Group: A
Progress Report, 23 FED. SENT'G REP. 110, 110-11 (2010) (finding that the movement towards "a
sentencing system that affords greater discretion to prosecutors and judges" requires an "increase ...
[in the] monitoring of sentencing practice and outcomes to ensure that unwarranted disparities are
minimized"); see also Eric Holder, Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Hold-
er's Remarks for the Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice and Congressional
Black Caucus Symposium "Rethinking Federal Sentencing Policy 25th Anniversary of the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act" (June 24, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attomey-general-
holder-s-remarks-charles-hamilton-houston-institute-race-and-justice.
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study funded by the U.S. Department of Justice reviewed the data, meth-
odology, and conclusions of eighty-five studies on sentencing practices
and concluded that, after controlling for other factors, "Latinos and Afri-
can-Americans were sentenced more harshly than whites on average."1 36
Researchers have summarized studies of state and federal sentencing
practices as "show[ing] legally prescribed factors are the strongest pre-
dictors of sentencing outcomes, but defendant social statuses often influ-
ence the likelihood and type of incarceration, sentence length, and guide-
line departures."1 3 7 Given the questionable nature of sentencing practices,
any sentence-based deportation regime would have to take unwarranted
sentencing disparities into account.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
Assuming that the political will could be generated for simple and
fair deportation rules, I argue for reforms that would create an over-five-
year actual sentence trigger for deportation and restore judicial discretion
to stop deportations. The proposal sketched below reflects the reality that
there are three basic choices for conditioning deportation on conviction
for a crime. Deportation could be made a function of type of crime,
length of sentence, or some combination of the two. As described above,
the current scheme is largely based on the type of crime but sometimes
also requires a sentence of a particular type and length.
The only way to significantly simplify the rules would be to take the
type of crime out of the deportation equation. As discussed above, feder-
alism complicates hinging removal on types of crime.' 38 The lack of a
single criminal code under which all defendants are prosecuted requires a
federal standard against which state convictions are judged using the
complex categorical approach described above. The only viable alterna-
tive is for Congress to tag deportation to sentence length, as a number of
countries in the United States' peer group already do. 139
A sentence-based deportation regime would represent a paradigm
shift in immigration law with immense efficiencies and benefits. The
practical barriers to the full implementation of Padilla would cease to
exist and noncitizen defendants would be much more likely to enjoy the
full extent of their Sixth Amendment right. No longer would defense
counsel, immigration attorneys, pro se noncitizens, federal appellate
136. Mitchell & MacKenzie, supra note 8, at 1, 12.
137. Jeffrey Ulmer, Michael T. Light & John Kramer, The "Liberation" of Federal Judges'
Discretion in the Wake of the Booker/Fanfan Decision: Is There Increased Disparity and Divergence
Between Courts?, 28 JUST. Q. 799, 801 (2011).
138. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
139. Australia and the United Kingdom, for example, have deportation rules that operate large-
ly by reference to length of sentence. Migration Act of 1958, section 201 (Australia); UK Borders
Act 2007, c. 30, § 32 (U.K). Although these countries have sentence triggers that are less than five
years, they also impose significantly shorter sentences for crimes than the United States. See infra
notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
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judges, immigration judges, and other agency adjudicators struggle with
the determination of whether a crime would lead to deportation. A plain
deportation scheme would also be more transparent and therefore more
legitimate. The general public would understand the deportation rule and
noncitizens would more likely be on notice of what crimes result in re-
moval.
At the same time, hinging deportation on sentence length is no sil-
ver bullet. As discussed above, chronic sentencing disparities, including
ones based on invidious grounds like race, render sentence length a blunt
instrument for treating like cases alike. A sentence-based deportation
regime could minimize the impact of sentencing disparities in two ways.
First, deportation could be made a consequence of only relatively long
criminal sentences, specifically an actually served sentence of over five
years. Second, Congress could legislate a return to the prior state of af-
fairs in which immigrants had robust opportunities to apply for relief
from removal in immigration court. I address each of these proposals in
turn.
A. A Long Sentence Deportation Trigger
Deportation of a noncitizen with lawful status should occur only if
the immigrant has been convicted of a crime for which he or she has ac-
tually served more than five years in prison. A five-year sentence stand-
ard has precedent in immigration law. It appeared in pre-1996 law as the
cutoff for eligibility for a discretionary waiver of deportation under for-
mer INA section 212(c). 14 0 Under that provision, lawful permanent resi-
dents who had been domiciled for seven years and who had not served
five years incarceration for an aggravated felony could apply to an im-
migration judge to retain their lawful permanent residency, despite hav-
ing been convicted of a crime.141 Although a sentence over five years has
never been required to trigger removal proceedings, I argue that it should
for several reasons.
Requiring a sentence of more than five years would offset the effect
of sentencing disparities. While reasonable minds can disagree about
what length of sentence constitutes the tipping point for deportation,
most would agree that a sentence of more than five years (even if it re-
flects some amount of invidious discrimination) is long enough to war-
rant at least the commencement of removal proceedings. Some of those
sentenced fairly to five years or under might also be people who most
would say should be subject to removal. But just as the "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" burden of proof in criminal cases is designed to acquit
some number of guilty people in order to ensure that few innocent people
are convicted, an over-five-year sentence deportation trigger would help
140. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1992) (repealed 1996).
141. Id
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to ensure that people who were sentenced unfairly are not deported, even
if it means that some people who should have been subject to removal
proceedings are permitted to remain. Any sentence-based deportation
scheme must err on the side of permitting people to stay who could have
been given longer sentences in high sentencing jurisdictions as a means
of ensuring that people who were sentenced unfairly are not erroneously
subjected to removal proceedings.
Further support for a rule based on an over-five-year sentence de-
rives from studies showing that length of time served correlates with
recidivism. 142 A relatively small group of offenders are convicted of the
majority of crimes. 143 If deportation for a crime is justified on public
safety grounds, it is most justified when targeted at individuals who have
proven to be chronic and serious lawbreakers. 1" Individuals who have
not served more than five years for a crime generally fall outside of this
category.1 4 5
Efficiency and cost considerations also weigh in favor of a long sen-
tence trigger for deportation. If fewer people are ensnared in deportation
proceedings, judges could hold fewer hearings and the number of people
in immigration detention would decrease. At a price tag of $159 per de-
tainee per day, the direct financial costs of immigration detention are
high.1 46 Moreover, our nation suffers multiple adverse ripple effects
142. LIN SONG & ROXANNE LIEB, WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, RECIDIVISM: THE
EFFECT OF INCARCERATION AND LENGTH OF TIME SERVED 5 (1993) ("[W]hile on parole, offenders
with the longest time served generally had higher recidivism rates than offenders with the shortest
time served." (quoting Don M. Gottfredson, Michael R. Gottfredson & James Garofalo, Time Served
in Prison and Parole Outcomes Among Parolee Risk Categories, 5 J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 8 (1977)); Long
sentences may cause recidivism. Martin H. Pritikin, Is Prison Increasing Crime?, 2008 WIS. L. REV.
1049, 1093 (2008) ("As of roughly a decade ago, prison increased crime by at least 7 percent. ...
[but] the true impact today is likely higher."); Paul Gendreau, Claire Goggin & Francis T. Cullen,
The Effects of Prison Sentences on Recidivism, PUB. SAFETY CAN. 15 (1999),
http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/ffcts-prsn-sntncs-rcdvsm/ffcts-prsn-sntncs-rcdvsm-
eng.pdf ("Spending more vs. less time in prison or being incarcerated vs. remaining in the communi-
ty was associated with slight increases in recidivism for 3 of 4 outcomes."); M. Keith Chen & Jesse
M. Shapiro, Do Harsher Prison Conditions Reduce Recidivism? A Discontinuity-based Approach, 9
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 22-23 (2007) (explaining that the harshness of prison conditions increases
recidivism).
143. See PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994, at 5 tbl.4 (2002), available at
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf; Pritikin, supra note 142, at 1087 ("It is well known that a
small percentage of offenders commit a disproportionately high percentage of crimes." (citing PETER
W. GREENWOOD & ALLAN ABRAHAMSE, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION 44-46 (1982)), available at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/R2815.pdf; Christy A. Visher, Incapacita-
tion and Crime Control: Does A "Lock 'Em Up" Strategy Reduce Crime?, 4 JUST. Q. 513, 523
(1987).
144. I and others have discussed the downsides of linking immigration enforcement to crime
control. See Allegra M. McLeod, The US. Criminal-Immigration Convergence and Its Possible
Undoing, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 105 (2012); Sharpless, supra note 128.
145. Indeed, some might argue that my proposal is not generous enough to convicted nonciti-
zens, as some people serve more than five years for offenses such as nonviolent drug crimes. See
Hall, supra note 7, at 1105 (illustrating how life sentences for nonviolent crimes are possible).
146. NAT'L IMMIGRATION FORUM, THE MATH OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION: RUNAWAY
COSTS FOR IMMIGRATION DETENTION DO NOT ADD UP TO SENSIBLE POLICIES 2 n.5 (2013) (report-
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when noncitizens with family and other ties to the United States are de-
tained and removed. 147
A further justification for linking deportation only to relatively long
sentences is the reality that the United States punishes people for crimes
far more harshly than others in its peer group. Per capita, the United
States criminally incarcerates more people for longer periods of time
than any other country in the world.148 We hold 2,228,400 people in our
criminal jails and prisons.149 Our rate of imprisonment compares to that
of Russia.15 0 We lock up over five times more people per capita than the
United Kingdom, Canada, France, and Germany.15 1 The United States
punishes drug offenders much more severely than similarly situated
countries.152 Given how out of step the United States is with comparable
countries, a relatively long sentence trigger for deportation would help to
offset the effect of the United States' harsh sentencing practices.
B. Restoration oflmmigration Judge Discretion
In addition to a lengthy sentence trigger, the restoration of discre-
tion to immigration judges to halt deportations in appropriate cases
ing that ICE claims the daily cost per detention bed is $119 but that this figure rises to $159 when
ICE's operational expenses are included).
147. See KALINA BRABECK ET AL., THE PSYCHOSOCIAL IMPACT OF DETENTION AND
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would also compensate for the impossibility of crafting a simple and
truly evenhanded system of deportation based only on the outcome of the
criminal system. As discussed above, Congress has repealed much of the
authority of immigration judges to use their discretion to stop deporta-
tions. A noncitizen's deportation fate is therefore largely sealed in the
criminal justice system. If discretion were restored to immigration judg-
es, they could act as fail-safes against unfair outcomes resulting from
harsh sentencing practices, among other things. Moreover, the significant
time saved by immigration judges not having to adjudicate complex chal-
lenges to removability could be used to adjudicate discretionary relief
cases on the merits.
Restoring discretion to stop deportation based on a criminal record
would also bring the United States back into compliance with its interna-
tional law obligations.1 54 In 2010, the Inter-American Commission held
in Wayne Smith, Hugo Armendariz, et al.'55 that the 1996 amendments to
U.S. immigration law repealing discretionary relief for lawful permanent
residents convicted of an aggravated felony violated the human rights to
family life and due process. 156 The Commission found that the petitioners
"had no opportunity to present a humanitarian defense to deportation or
to have their rights to family duly considered before deportation. Nor
were the best interests of their . . . U.S. citizen children taken into ac-
count by any decision maker." 157 According to the Commission, "a bal-
ancing test" was required to "reach a fair decision between the compet-
ing individual human rights and the needs asserted by the State."'15  Other
international bodies, including the European Court of Human Rights,
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have also ruled that human rights law places limitations on a nation's
sovereign right to deport.159
The United States' punitive approach to criminal and immigration
law enforcement puts it out of step with its peer group and international
standards. Reform efforts to simplify the law and fully realize immi-
grants' Sixth Amendment rights must go hand in hand with the scaling
back of harsh immigration consequences for crimes and the restoration of
immigration judge discretion.
CONCLUSION
The legal regime governing deportation for a crime is simultaneous-
ly complex and coherent. I have argued that we should interpret Padilla
as enunciating a rule about predictability, not simplicity. Defense counsel
discharge their Padilla duty only when they advise their clients of pre-
dictable immigration consequences, even if they must engage in legal
research.' 60 At the same time, all stakeholders-defendants, defense at-
torneys, criminal and immigration judges, and prosecutors-stand to gain
from the simplification of the rules governing the intersection of criminal
and immigration law. The current rules largely hinge on a type-of-crime
analysis that can be complex because state convictions must be compared
to a federal standard. While this categorical approach has become much
better defined in recent years, a sentence trigger would be exponentially
easier to understand and implement.
A fair sentence-based regime would be difficult to achieve, howev-
er. Congress has passed increasingly harsh legislation against noncitizens
convicted of a crime over the last three decades, and any wholesale re-
vamping based on sentence length could leave more, rather than fewer,
people subject to removal. The wide disparities in sentencing practices,
including on invidious grounds, also call into question the efficacy of
length of sentence as a basis for removal. Notwithstanding these formi-
dable reservations, I have argued that, on balance, both noncitizens and
our justice system are better served by a sentence-based removal regime
that conditions removal of lawfully present noncitizens on having actual-
ly been incarcerated for more than five years for a crime and restores
discretion to immigration judges to halt removal in appropriate cases. An
over-five-years sentence basis for deportation is sufficiently lengthy to
ameliorate the effects of unfair sentencing. The ability of judges to grant
159. Human Rights Comm., Madafferi v. Australia, Comm. No. 1011/2001, ¶ 9.8, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/81/D/101 1/2001 (Aug. 26, 2004) (finding a violation of the right to family life if immigrant
was deported because of hardship to his family who had lived in Australia for many years); Am-
rollahi v. Denmark, App. No. 56811/00, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 41, 43-44 (2002) (holding that Denmark
would violate the right to family life if it deported a man with a serious drug offense because his
family would face "serious difficulties"); Boultif v. Switzerland, App. No. 54273/00, Eur. Ct. H.R.,147 (2001) (ruling that an immigrant convicted of a violent crime could not be deported because the
sovereign right to deport for a criminal record must be put in "fair balance" with right to family life).
160. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 357 (2009).
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relief from deportation on a case-by-case basis would further help to
ensure just results. Moreover, such a scheme would also restore United
States' compliance with international law.
As our nation contemplates immigration reform, it must carefully
consider how the law should regard noncitizens with criminal records.
Amendments to immigration law have historically constituted a one-way
street of progressively harsh penalties for criminal activity. The current
debate about immigration continues to perpetrate the over-simplified
assumption that any noncitizen with a nontrivial criminal record has no
place in our society. While the need for clear and simple immigration
laws governing deportation for a crime is beyond controversy, reform
efforts in the name of simplicity must simultaneously seek to reverse our
nation's draconian historical approach.
